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CREATION AND EFFECT OF PERSONAL LIABILITY
ON MORTGAGE DEBTS IN NEW YORK
By MILTON R. FRIEDMANf
FULL liability on a mortgage imports more than an obligation to pay
the debt thereby secured. In the usual mortgage are contained covenants
affecting priorities, after-acquired titles, and other matters. Personal
liability on the debt and these covenants may be incurred by a grantee
who assumes the mortgage as well as by the original mortgagor. This
Article will discuss the creation of such liabilities, the rights of the mort-
gagee stemming therefrom, and the various incidents of mortgage lia-
bilities so created.
CREATION OF LIABILITY
Original Mortgagor. The mere execution of a mortgage does not
create a personal liability on the part of the mortgagor to pay the debt.'
In the absence of a bond or other obligation to pay the debt secured by
the mortgage, no covenant to pay will be implied and the remedy of the
mortgagee is confined to an enforceable lien upon the land.2 An express
covenant in the mortgage to pay the debt is sufficient to make the mort-
gage enforceable as a bond.' That an unqualified admission of liability
in the mortgage is likewise sufficient was the holding in Elder v. Rouse,4
but this case has been distinguished more often than it has been fol-
lowed.' The mortgagor's usual method of incurring personal liability'
t Member of the New York and Connecticut Bars.
1. Goodhue v. Berrien, 2 Sandf. Ch. 630 (N. Y. 1845) ; Baldwin v. Rapplee, 2 Fed.
Cas. 526, No. 801 (N. D. N. Y. 1871); Brown v. Dewe, 1 Sandf. Ch. 56 (N. Y. 1843),
rev'd on other grounds, 2 Barb. 28 (N. Y. 1847) ; 1 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928)
§ 436; see Matthews v. Sheehan, 69 N. Y. 585, 591 (1877); Glover v. Payn, 19 Wend.
518, 521 (N. Y. 1838).
2. Wood v. Travis, 231 App. Div. 331, 248 N. Y. Supp. 22 (3d Dep't 1931). This
is specifically provided by N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 249; see 2 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed.
1928) § 838. Furthermore, N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 251, providing that no covenants
are implied in conveyances, has been applied to mortgages. Stoddard v. Weston, 53 Hun.
634, 6 N. Y. Supp. 34 (Sup. Ct. 1889).
3. Sullivan v. Corn Exch. Bank, 154 App. Div. 292, 139 N. Y. Supp. 97 (2d Dep't
1912); Dinniny v. Gavin, 4 App. Div. 298, 39 N. Y. Supp. 485 (3d Dep't 1896), aff'd,
159 N. Y. 556, 54 N. E. 1090 (1899). The possibility of an inadvertent assumption, par-
ticularly where no separate bond was given, led one court to admit parol proof of the
purpose for which the mortgage was given. Wood v. Travis, 231 App. Div. 331, 248
N. Y. Supp. 22 (3d Dep't 1931).
4. 15 Wend. 218 (N. Y. 1836); Consumers Brewing Co. v. Braun, 147 App. Div.
171, 132 N. Y. Supp. 87 (2d Dep't 1911); see Culver v. Sisson, 3 N. Y. 264, 266 (1850).
5. See cases discussed in Smith v. Rice, 12 Daly 307, 310-311 (N. Y. Comm. Pl.
1884).
6. A recital of consideration or amount of the debt secured creates no personal
liability because, in the absence of a bond, such recitals more readily indicate an intention
19401 -PERSONAL LIABILITY ON MORTGAGE DEBTS 225
is the execution and delivery of a bond.- The assumption is generally
repeated in the accompanying mortgage if any of the generally used
mortgage forms is followed." The New York Legislature has popular-
ized an abbreviated mortgage by the creation of a statutory short form,9
the interpretation of which is set forth in an expanded statutory con-
struction."° The statutory form of mortgage contains the clause: "The
mortgagor will pay the indebtedness as above provided," which serves
to create a personal liability to pay.1
to balance accounts, to validate the lien by evidence of past or future consideration, or to
cancel the debt. Mack v. Austin, 29 Hun. 534 (4th Dep't 1833), aff'd, 95 N. Y. 513
(1884); Coleman v. Van Rensselaer, 44 How. Pr. 368 (N. Y. 1873).
7. Bond and mortgage are construed together but the bond prevails in case of re-
pugnancy, even though it is the mortgage, and not the bond, which is publicly recorded.
Adler v. Berkowitz, 254 N. Y. 433, 173 N. E. 574 (1930) ; Cunningham v. Pressed Steel
Car Co., 238 App. Div. 624, 265 N. Y. Supp. 256, aff'd, 263 N. Y. 671, 189 N. E. 750
(1934); Biedka v. Ashkenas, 119 Misc. 647, 197 N. Y. Supp. 851 (Sup. Ct. 1922). If,
however, the recorded mortgage recites a lesser sum than the bond, a bona fide purchaser
is protected. Frost v. Beekman, 18 Johns. 544 (1820). But see Note (1934) 90 A. L R.
1432.
8. Ordinarily, the wife joining in the mortgage to bind her dower incurs no liabil-
ity under the mortgage. Gillig v. Maas, 28 N. Y. 191 (1863) ; Hudson City Say. Inst.
v. McArthur, 8 N. Y. Wkly. Dig. 63 (Sup. Ct. 1879). See also N. Y. R&%L PRoP. LAW
§ 190. In the event of inadvertent assumption, she may obtain reformation. Blackwell v.
Frantzblau, N. Y. L. J. Aug. 3, 1938, p. 298, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.); see Hamlin v. Callan,
256 App. Div. 877, 9 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 201 (3d Dep't 1939) (default reopened and
answer permitted on showing wife received no proceeds of mortgage and joined in execu-
tion of same to bind dower) ; Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Gendillon Corp., N. Y. L J.
April 19, 1940, p. 1789 (Sup. Ct.); cf. Wood v. Travis, 231 App. Div. 331, 248 N. Y.
Supp. 22 (3d Dep't 1931). Contra: Lagana v. Austin Place Realty Co., N. Y. L. J.
June 22, 1939, p. 2892 (Sup. Ct.) ; cf. Quackenbush v. Quackenbush, 130 Misc. 733, 225
N. Y. Supp. 152 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
9. N. Y. REAL PRop. LAW § 258, Schedule M, construed in § 254.
10. N. Y. REA. PRop. LAw § 258 sets forth abbreviated forms of instruments af-
fecting real property and indicates how the shorter forms recommended for use shall
be construed. Use of the statutory form is not required. Goldberg v. Norek, 101 Misc.
371, 166 N. Y. Supp. 1023 (Sup. Ct. 1917); Rodler v. Pacht, 118 Misc. 331, 194 N. Y.
Supp. 241 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
11. Quackenbush v. Quackenbush, 130 Misc. 738, 225 N. Y. Supp. 152 (Sup. Ct.
1927); Goldman v. Rhoades, 122 Misc. 567, 203 N. Y. Supp. 548 (Sup. Ct. 1924);
Briggs v. Bowery Say. Bank, Westchester L. J., Jan. 18, 1924, p. 1438 (Sup. Ct. 1934);
see Otselic Valley Nat. Bank v. Dapson, 170 Misc. 514, 515, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 588 (Sup.
Ct. 1939). N. Y. REALr Pzop. LAW § 258, Schedule N, sets forth a statutory form com-
bination bond and mortgage which likewise creates a liability for the mortgage debt.
Katz v. Katz, 80 Misc. 170, 140 N. Y. Supp. 971 (Sup. Ct. 1913), aff'd, 159 App. Div.
921, 144 N. Y. Supp. 1122 (2d Dep't 1913), aff'd, 217 N. Y. 651, 112 N. E. 1061 (1916).
If the obligation is expressed in an unsealed note, separate statutes of limitation will
govern the debt and the mortgage from their inception and the statute may bar the debt
without impairing the enforceability of the mortgage. Hulbert v. Clark, 128 N. Y. 295,
28 N. E. 638 (1891); Broward Operating Co. v. Harding, 167 Misc. 573, 3 N. Y. S.
(2d) 696 (Sup. Ct. 1938). Even where bond and mortgage are under seal, the scame
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Assuming Grantee. After conveyance of the premises by the mort-
gagor, the grantee may assume the mortgage by an agreement with the
mortgagee, whose promise to modify or extend the mortgage supplies
adequate consideration for the new owner's assumption.' 2 More difficult
problems, however, are presented where the assumption is by agreement
between mortgagor and grantee - an agreement to which the mortgagee
is a stranger. A conveyance merely subject to a mortgage imposes no
liability for the mortgage debt on the grantee, regardless of any deduc-
tion of the amount of the mortgage from the purchase price as part
of the consideration;"3 nor is the grantee liable to indemnify the mort-
gagor against the mortgage. 14 Moreover, payment of neither interest
nor principal by the grantee implies any obligation on the mortgage debt.1"
It is generally established that a grantee's acceptance of a deed con-
taining an affirmative covenant on the grantee's part constitutes a
valid assumption of the covenant, even though the grantee does not
sign the deed.'" Assumption of a mortgage could formerly be effected
in New York by a grantee in this manner'" or even by parol.18 But
result may occur after sale of the property, where payments of principal or interest made
by the grantee do not prevent the running of the statute against the mortgagor. Brooklyn
Say. Bank v. Wechsler Estate, 259 N. Y. 9, 180 N. E. 752 (1932).
12. Silverstein v. Brown, 153 App. Div. 677, 138 N. Y. Supp. 848 (1st Dep't 1912);
see Ganz v. Lancaster, 169 N. Y. 357, 366, 62 N. E. 413, 415-416 (1902) ; Ross v. Davis,
138 Misc. 863, 864, 248 N. Y. Supp. 441 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
13. People ex re. Banner v. State Tax Comm., 244 N. Y. 159, 162, 155 N. E. 84, 85
(1926); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 382; 1 WILTSIE, MORTGAGE Foan-
CLosuREs (5th ed. 1939) § 218; 2 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 942.
14. See Smith v. Trustlow, 84 N. Y. 660 (1881); 2 Wirsrox, CONTRACTS (rev.
ed. 1936) § 383, n. 4; 1 WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES (5th ed. 1939) § 218. For
minority rule see 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 622 c seq.; 1 WiLTSiE,
op. cit. supra, §220; Notes (1937) 111 A. L. R. 1114, 1124, L. R. A. 1917C 592, 594-
595.
15. See Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U. S. 436, 447 (1891).
Conversely, the grantee may not recover accrued interest from the grantor. Lynch v.
Rinaldo, 58 How. Pr. 133 (N. Y. Comm. P1. 1876).
16. Post v. West Shore R. R., 123 N. Y. 580, 26 N. E. 7 (1890).
17. Thorp v. Keokuk Coal Co., 48 N. Y. 253 (1872); Blyer v. Monholland, 2 Sandf.
Ch. 526 (N. Y. 1845) ; see Belmont v. Coman, 22 N. Y. 438, 439 (1860) ; Freeman v.
Auld, 44 N. Y. 50, 55 (1870) ; Trotter v. Hughes, 12 N. Y. 74, 77 (1854); cf. Genesee
Valley Nat. Bank v. Bolton, 248 App. Div. 530, 290 N. Y. Supp. 913 (4th Dep't 1936).
For excellent discussion see 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 623.
Where the deed is not signed by the assuming grantee, the statute of limitations
affecting specialties is applied to the assumption wherever the deed is deemed to be the
act of both parties. Bowen v. Beck, 94 N. Y. 86 (1883). The cases are not uniform.
See Note (1936) 51 A. L. R. 911.
18. The assumption of a mortgage is an original undertaking and not within the
Statute of Frauds. Taintor v. Hemmingway, 18 Hun. 458 (3d Dep't 1879), aff'd, 83 N. Y.
610 (1880) ; see Howard v. Robbins, 67 App. Div. 245, 249, 73 N. Y. Supp. 172, 175
(4th Dep't 1901), aff'd, 170 N. Y. 498, 63 N. E. 530 (1902); In rc Amsdell-Kirchner
Brewing Co., 240 Fed. 492, 497 (N. D. N. Y. 1917).
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by an act effective April 6, 1938, no mortgage assumption by deed is
valid unless signed and admowledged by the grantee." As the statute is
prospective in operation only, the lien of countless mortgages on record
as of the date of passage will be preserved indefinitely. Insofar as these
were assumed before that date, the old rule will continue to obtain. 0
The holder of a mortgage to which the statute does not apply may
not rely conclusively upon an assumption clause in a deed subsequent
to the mortgage. The assumption clause is not regarded as part of the
grant but as a collateral contractual undertaking, personal in nature,
requiring a meeting of the minds.2' The mortgagee has the burden of
establishing the delivery and acceptance of the deed, the grantee's knowl-
edge of the existence of the assumption clause, and an understanding
of the grantor and grantee with respect to the provisions and meaning
of the clause purporting to bind the grantee personally.22 Acceptance or
retention of the deed by the grantee is evidence of assent.23 but the rule
that a purchaser is deemed to know everything in his deed has been held
inapplicable to the assumption clause.24 Recordation of the deed by the
grantee is not conclusive proof that he agreed to be bound by the as-
sumption clause,25 though it is regarded as evidence of a contract between
the grantor and grantee.2 If the covenant in the deed was unknown to
the grantee, the mortgagee may not enforce it,2- and the grantee may
obtain reformation of the deed in a foreclosure or separate action.2- If
the deed is accepted by the grantee's agent, the knowledge and assent
of the agent are insufficient to hold the grantee; the mortgagee must
19. N. Y. Civ. PRAcr. Acr § 1083-C; Legis. (1938) 13 ST. Jon.x's L. Rnv. 215.
20. As the statute refers only to a mortgage which "shall be hereafter executed,"
it will apparently not govern assumptions, made subsequent to its enactment, of mort-
gages theretofore executed.
21. Blass v. Terry, 156 N. Y. 122, 50 N. E. 953 (1898); Genesee Valley Nat. Bank
v. Bolton, 248 App. Div. 530, 290 N. Y. Supp. 913 (4th Dep't 1936).
Assumption by the grantee subsequent to acquisition of title may be unenforceable
for want of consideration. Matter of Smathers, 153 Misc. 132, 140, 274 N. Y. Supp.
717, 729 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
22. Genesee Valley Nat. Bank v. Bolton, 248 App. Div. 530, 290 N. Y. Supp. 913
(4th Dep't 1936); Crowe v. Leivin, 95 N. Y. 423 (1884); 2 Jo-.,S, MoaGc.GS (8th ed.
1928) § 942; THoMAs, MoRTGAGES (3d ed. 1914) § 610 et seq.
23. Blass v. Terry, 156 N. Y. 122, 126-127, 50 N. E. 953 (1898).
24. Albany City Say. Inst. v. Burdick, 87 N. Y. 39 (1881); 'Matter of Smathers,
153 Misc. 132, 140, 274 N. Y. Supp. 717, 729 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
25. Blass v. Terry, 156 N. Y. 122, 126, 50 N. E. 953 (1898).
26. Kilmer v. Smith, 77 N. Y. 226 (1879); Union Trust Co. v. Allen, 239 App.
Div. 661, 664, 268 N. Y. Supp. 437, 441 (4th Dep't 1934).
27. Kelly v. Geer, 101 N. Y. 664, 5 N. E. 332 (1886); Albany Say. Inst. v. Bur-
dick, 87 N. Y. 39 (1881); Deyerman v. Chamberlin, 22 Hun. 110 (2d Dep't 1830).
Where a negotiable mortgage note is used, the defense wvill not prevail against a bona
fide purchaser for value. Hayden v. Drury, 3 Fed. 782 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1880).
28. Kilmer v. Smith, 77 N. Y. 226 (1879); Arnstein v. Bernstein, 127 App. Div.
550, 111 N. Y. Supp. 987 (1st Dep't 1908) (citing cases).
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show the agent's power to bind the grantee to pay.29 Subsequent rati-
fication by the principal may, however, be established through proof of
the principal's knowledge both of the actual facts and of the legal effect
of his act. The mere payment of interest without knowledge of the as-
sumption is insufficient.30 Reconveyance of the premises by the grantee
may be evidence of ratification,3' but not if it is done without knowledge
of the assumption.32 Nor is ratification to be spelled out of an instru-
ment certifying the mortgage to be valid and free of offset and defense,
given by an owner to induce a purchase of the mortgage.83
MORTGAGEE'S RIGHTS AGAINST ASSUMING GRANTEE
If the mortgagee establishes delivery and acceptance of the deed and
a purposive assumption on the grantee's part, under new rule or old, his
right of enforcement may still be defeated by technical requirements or
equities in the grantee's favor.3 4 In cases in which the 1938 statute
does not apply, the mortgagee is required to establish not only the grantee's
intention to assume but compliance with other conditions precedent as
well. The new statute, by its requirement of writing, simplifies the proving
of intention but does not purport to affect other conditions to inception
of liability or matters in avoidance. Inasmuch as the mortgagee's rights
are derivative,3" the assuming grantee may interpose any defense avail-
able against his grantor.36
29. Blass v. Terry, 156 N. Y. 122, 128, 50 N. E. 953, 954 (1898) ; Matter of Smath-
ers, 153 Misc. 132, 141, 274 N. Y. Supp. 717, 730 (Surr. Ct. 1934). But specific authority
to assume a particular mortgage is unnecessary where the agent has general authority
to buy real estate for cash or credit. Schley v. Fryer, 100 N. Y. 71, 2 N. E. 280 (1885).
30. Drury v. Hayden, 111 U. S. 223 (1884).
31. Baxter Operating Co. v. Matz, N. Y. L. J. Nov. 2, 1939, p. 1441, col. 6 (Sup.
Ct.) (reconveyance held ratification); accord, Dale v. Akin, 27 S. W. (2d) 327 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1930); cf. Campbell v. Smith, 71 N. Y. 26 (1877).
32. Kelly v. Geer, 101 N. Y. 664, 5 N. E. 332 (1886).
33. Union Trust Co. v. Allen, 239 App. Div. 661, 268 N. Y. Supp. 437 (4th Dep't
1934). Whenever mortgages are non-negotiable, it is the practice of an intending pur-
chaser of a mortgage to require an estoppel certificate.
34. But the grantee in this situation need not await action by the mortgagee but
may, in a proper case, obtain rescission in an action against his grantor alone. In Crowe
v. Lewin, 95 N. Y. 423, 427 (1884), the plaintiff sought to set aside an exchange of prop-
erty on the ground that the deed running to the plaintiff conveyed premises other than
those agreed upon. Defendant, whose deed provided for an assumption of the mortgage
encumbering the parcel conveyed by plaintiff, argued that, in view of the assumption,
rescission could not restore the status quo. In deciding for the plaintiff, the court ruled
that its decree "annuls the deed and adjudges that the land did not pass, and so the
[mortgagee] can have no right of action upon a promise divested by the judgment of
any consideration."
35. Dunning v. Leavitt, 85 N. Y. 30, 35 (1881); Morales v. Joanou, 146 Misc. 515,
516-517, 262 N. Y. Supp. 468, 470 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
36. Flagg v. Munger, 9 N. Y. 483 (1854); see Arnold v. Nichols, 64 N. Y. 117
(1876) ; Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons (1918) 27 YAIX L. J. 1008,
1024; Notes (1922) 21 A. L. R. 439, 488, (1936) 100 A. L. R. 911.
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An agreement between grantor and grantee, making the latter's as-
sumption subject to conditions precedent, has been held to qualify the
mortgagee's right of enforcement. Flagg z,. Mungcr 7 and Judson v.
Dada8 involved agreements arising out of shortages in acreage con-
veyed. In the Flagg case, the grantee discovered the shortage after
preparation of the deed but before its delivery. At his instance the deed
was accompanied by the grantor's bond securing the grantee for part
of the mortgage debt assumed by the grantee in the conveyance, and by
a stipulation expressly conditioning the assumption upon the grantor's
compliance with the terms of the bond. The grantor's default on the
collateral bond was held to release the assuming grantee completely. In
the Judson case, the deed expressly purported to convey 80 acres and
recited that any difference would be adjusted at the rate of $30 an acre.
Subsequent to the conveyance, the grantor gave the grantee an unrecorded
instrument making allowance for the shortage and reducing the grantee's
liability pro tanto. This agreement was upheld as against the mortgagee.
Even parol agreements made simultaneously with the conveyance which
give the grantee the option to reconvey and be released from his assump-
tion have been enforced 9 where acted upon in good faith before a preju-
dicial change of position on the part of the mortgagee.40
The assuming grantee who takes title by quitclaim deed can not defend
against the assumption agreement on grounds of failure of title."1 Even
if the grantor has warranted the title, the mortgagee can recover prior
to eviction or to an offer on the grantee's part to surrender the premises
as a basis for equitable relief.' It has been said that if failure of title
were later urged successfully, equity could, if the defendant paid a defi-
ciency judgment, furnish relief by revival of the mortgage or some form
of subrogation.43 This is no more than the right, inhering in any owner,
to pay the mortgage and take it by assignment. This right in these cir-
cumstances - succession to a junior lien after establishment of a para-
mount title - is probably of no value unless it is also coupled with a
right on the bond. In Dunning v. Leavitt,44 an assuming grantee who
acquired title through a full covenant and warranty deed had been evicted
37. 9 N. Y. 483 (1854); see Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons
(1918) 27 YAu L. J. 1008, 1028.
38. 79 N. Y. 373 (1880).
39. Devlin v. Murphy, 56 How. Pr. 326 (Sup. Ct. 1878).
40. Fleischauer v. Doellner, 58 How. Pr. 190 (Sup. Ct. 1879).
41. Thorp v. Keokuk Coal Co., 48 N. Y. 253 (1872).
42. Parkinson v. Sherman, 74 N. Y. 88 (1878) ; cf. Ed\wards v. Bodine, 26 Wend. 109
(N. Y. 1841); Tallmadge v. Wallis, 25 Wend. 107 (N. Y. 1840). But cf. Wager v.
Link, 134 N. Y. 122, 125, 127, 31 N. E. 213, 214, 215 (1892).
43. Gifford v. Father Matthew T. A. B. Soc., 104 N. Y. 139, 142, 10 N. E. 39, 40
(1887).
44. 85 N. Y. 30 (1881).
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by a paramount title prior to foreclosure. The mortgagee's efforts to
obtain a deficiency judgment were defeated on the ground that the evic-
tion represented a total failure of consideration for the assumption agree-
ment. The majority held that the assumption had not been given for
a promise but for the land and that there was no fund, i.e., land, in
the defendant's hands applicable to the mortgage. The dissenting judge
argued that the conveyance was consideration and that the grantee's lia-
bility was absolute, subject only to a counterclaim for breach of covenant.
In the earlier ejectment action the rents and profits previously received
by the grantee had been remitted to the lawful owner; the grantee ap-
parently never obtained any beneficial enjoyment of the premises. If the
failure of title had affected only part of the land conveyed, there would
be force to the suggestion that the grantee's right be limited to a counter-
claim for breach of covenant in the degree in which this counterclaim
would have been available against the grantor.4' If the grantee had ob-
tained the beneficial use of the premises, it would seem that a tender
of rescission could be made only if restoration of the status quo were
also offered.4
Although the mortgagee may in many instances enforce the grantee's
assumption at the time of the conveyance, the question as to whether
the mortgagee's rights under the assumption may subsequently be
released by an agreement to which he is a stranger is not definitely
settled. The answer to this question requires a consideration of the theory
of the mortgagee's position and the influence which has been exerted
upon it by the third party beneficiary doctrine.
It should be noted at the outset that the mortgagee is not a party to
the assumption agreement, that no consideration therefor moves from
him, and that he may not even be aware of its existence. Nevertheless,
even before Lawrence v. FoP, 47 a mortgagee was held to have rights
arising out of the grantee's assumption by deed. In Halsey v. Reed,
48
the Court of Chancery held that the intention of an assuming grantee was
not to pay the amount of the mortgage to the grantor but to indemnify
the grantor against the mortgage. Under the theory of "equitable subro-
gation" laid down in this case, as between grantor and assuming grantee,
the latter became the principal debtor and the former stood in the position
of a surety. The assumption was in the nature of an indemnity for
the grantor and the creditor (mortgagee) became entitled to the benefit
of the security received by the surety. Under this theory of equitable
45. Compare Loeb v. Willis, 100 N. Y. 231, 3 N. E. 177 (1885).
46. Slater v. Slater, 208 App. Div. 567, 573, 204 N. Y. Supp. 112, 117 (1st Dep't
1924), af'd, 240 N. Y. 557, 148 N. E. 703 (1925); cf. Cox v. Stokes, 156 N. Y. 491,
506-507, 51 N. E. 316, 320-321 (1898).
47. 20 N. Y. 268 (1859).
48. 9 Paige 445 (N. Y. 1842); cf. Ayers v. Dixon, 78 N. Y. 318 (1879).
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subrogation, mortgagees were permitted to recover deficiency judgments
against assuming grantees in foreclosure actions.4" Their rights were
based upon the existence of a "surety," liable for payment of the debt
and possessed of "collateral security," regardless of whether the mort-
gagee acted upon the credit of this security in the first instance or even
knew of its existence." If the grantor had not assumed the mortgage,
he was under no liability which could be the subject of indemnification;
the elements of equitable subrogation were lacking, and the mortgagee
could not enforce the grantee's assumption.5'
Under equitable subrogation the mortgagee's rights were in equity 2
and he could proceed against the grantee directly to avoid circuity of
action;" but as he lacked privity, 4 he had no status as the third party
beneficiary of a contract"' and could maintain no action at law on the
bond."0 If the lien of his mortgage had been cut off by the foreclosure
of a paramount mortgage, he had no remedy against the grantee.57
The term "equitable subrogation" has been criticised by Professor
Williston because it "suggests analogies which do not exist, with the
position of a surety who has paid the debt."5 8 He argues that the relief
granted the mortgagee is merely the application toward payment of
the debt of the mortgagor's property, consisting of the promise running
to him from the grantee of the mortgaged premises. This "asset" theory
is criticised by Professor Corbin on the ground that the grantee's promise
is not available to creditors of the mortgagor other than the mortgagee
and that the differentiation of the mortgagee from other creditors is but
the recognition of a special right in personam vested in the mortgagee. '0
49. Halsey v. Reed, 9 Paige 445 (N. Y. 1842) ; Curtis v. Tyler, 9 Paige 431 (N. Y.
1842) ; Blyer v. 'Monholland, 2 Sandf. Ch. 526 (N. Y. 1845).
50. Curtis v. Tyler, 9 Paige 432, 435 (N. Y. 1842).
51. King v. Whitely, 10 Paige 465 (N. Y. 1843); Trotter v. Hughes, 12 N. Y.
74, 78 (1854).
52. Thorp v. Keokuk Coal Co., 48 N. Y. 253, 257 (1872); Pardee v. Treat, 82 N. Y.
385, 387 (1880) ; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Aitken, 125 N. Y. 660, 670, 26 N. .. 732, 734
(1891); Crowell v. Currier, 27 N. J. Eq. 152, 154 (1876), aff'd Msb. norn. Crowell v.
Hospital of St. Barnabas, 27 N. J. Eq. 650, 656 (1876) ; Knapp v. Connecticut Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 85 Fed. 329, 331 (C. C. A. 8th, 1898).
53. Crowell v. Hospital of St. Barnabas, 27 N. J. Eq. 650, 656 (1876) ; Hubard v.
Thacker, 132 Va. 33, 41, 110 S. E. 263, 266 (1922).
54. Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 610, 621 (1890).
55. King v. XVhitely, 10 Paige 465, 468 (N. Y. 1843) ; Crowell v. Currier, 27 N. J.
Eq. 152, 154 (1876), affd sub. non. Crowell v. Hospital of St. Barnabas, 27 N. J. Eq.
650 (1876).
56. See Burr v. Beers, 24 N. Y. 178, 179 (1861); Mellen v. Whipple, 67 Mass. 317,
324 (1854) ; Note (1939) 25 VA. L. Ruv. 993, 995; cf. note 67 infra.
57. Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 610, 625-626 (1889).
58. 2 WiLLisToN, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 384; see 3 TiFF.N-Y, REAL ProEmrrv
(2d ed. 1920) § 623.
59. ANsoN, CONTRACTS (Corbin's 5th ed. 1930) § 295.
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Considering first Professor Williston's criticism, it is perhaps illogical
to characterize the mortgagor, a primary party, as a "surety." Yet, by
token of the same logic, the conveyance of mortgaged premises is gener-
ally deemed to make the personal liability of the mortgagor secondary
and to make his position akin to that of a surety. 0 Furthermore, the
analogy to a surety who has paid the debt seems questionable. If ii be
remembered that the assuming grantee is primarily responsible, at least
with respect to the grantor, and that the mortgagee may in the first
instance resort to either or to both,0 ' the grantee's position appears to
be more nearly akin to that of an indemnitor against liability than to that
of an indemnitor against loss.
6 2
If, however, the asset theory is, as Professor Corbin argues, illogical
in giving the mortgagee a preference over the grantor's other creditors,
it should be noted first that preferences are valid except where they are
expressly forbidden by statute. 3 Furthermore, asset, subrogation, and
kindred theories which entail possible preferences are frequently applied
in mortgage law0" as well as in closely analogous situations." It should
be noted that Professor Corbin claims for the mortgagee but a "special
right in personam," a limitation imposed by the cases which deny the
mortgagee a right on the bond as a full-fledged third party beneficiary.
But this limitation, which today is the chief objection to the doctrine of
60. After a sale of the premises by the mortgagor, the land is deemed, as between
the mortgagor and grantee, primarily responsible for the debt. Murray v. Marshall,
94 N. Y. 611, 614-615 (1884). The same result is automatically effected by statute upon
the mortgagor's death. N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 250; Hauselt v. Patterson, 124 N. Y.
349, 26 N. E. 937 (1891). If only part of the premises is conveyed to a grantee who
assumes the entire mortgage, the part conveyed is first to be sold in foreclosure. See
pp. 248, 249 infra. Modification of the mortgage by the mortgagee and a subsequent
owner without the mortgagor's consent, may release the mortgagor from his obligation.
Calvo v. Davies, 73 N. Y. 211 (1878).
61. See Shipman v. Niles, 75 App. Div. 451, 453-454, 78 N. Y. Supp, 440, 441 (1st
Dep't 1902), aff'd, 177 N. Y. 527, 69 N. E. 1132 (1902).
62. A bond given for indemnity against loss is not enforceable before actual payment
by the obligee whereas an indemnity against liability is enforceable immediately upon
breach. Albert v. Freedman, 253 N. Y. 508, 171 N. E. 760 (1930); see authorities col-
lected in (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1015, 1016.
The mortgagee's right against the assuming grantee has been placed in part upon
"the equity of the statute" (now N. Y. Civ. PAc. AcT 1079 [7]), permitting the joinder
in a foreclosure action of any person liable to the plaintiff for payment of the mortgage
debt. Blyer v. Monholland, 2 Sandf. Ch. 526 (N. Y. 1845); Gifford v. Corrigan, 117
N. Y. 257, 264, 22 N. E. 756, 758 (1889).
63. First Nat. Bank v. New York Title Ins. Co., 171 Misc. 854, 859, 12 N. Y. S.
(2d) 703, 710 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ; (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1325, 1328.
64. Compare notes 133-134, 138-139, 142-144, 168-172 infra; Note (1919) 2 A. L. R.
242; (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 683; Spencer v. Spencer, 95 N. Y. 353, 358 (1884).
65. Zeiser v. Cohn, 207 N. Y. 407, 101 N. E. 184 (1913) (creditor of vendor sub-
rogated to vendor's lien) ; Binghamton Say. Bank v. Binghamton Trust Co. 85 Hun. 75
(4th Dep't 1895).
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equitable subrogation, is an anachronism deriving from the separation
of law and equity. It makes the mortgagee's rights "depend upon the
number of officials or courts to whom application must be made or upon
the complexity of machinery of enforcement."0 "
Apart from his status under the theory of equitable subrogation, the
mortgagee has certain rights stemming from the rule of Lawrence v.
Fox. In that case Holly, owing $300 to Lawrence, loaned this sum to
Fox who promised Holly to pay the money to Lawrence on the following
day. Lawrence was held to have an action at law against Fox on Fox's
promise to Holly, supported by consideration from Holly to Fox to which
Lawrence was not a privy. Before this case there was some authority
supporting the right of a third party beneficiary to enforce a contract
at law.67 The history of the third party beneficiary doctrine since
Lawrence v. Fox has been a checkered one of sorties and retreats, "of
alternate enunciation of broad principle and narrow doctrine." Gs Although
the Court of Appeals has frequently said that the rule is to be confined
within its original limits,6 9 Lawrence v. Fox was followed by Burr -.
Beers, in which a mortgagee recovered a judgment on the bond directly
66. ANSON, CoaAcTs (Corbin's 5th ed. 1930) § 295. But see 2 Wn.juSroN, Co.-
TRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 385.
67. Schemerhorn v. Vanderheyden, 1 Johns. 139 (N. Y. 1806) ; Barker v. Bucklin,
2 Denio 45 (N. Y. 1846); see Burr v. Beers, 24 N. Y. 178, 180 (1861); Roussel v. St.
Nicholas Ins. Co., 9 Jones & S. 279, 283 (1876). Before Lawrence v. Fox, promises
for the benefit of close relations who were sole beneficiaries were enforceable by the
beneficiaries. Comment (1919) 4 CoRe. L. Q. 53, 54 et seq. For a discussion of the
English cases, see Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons (1930) 4t) L Q.
REv. 12; FINLAY, CoNracTs FOR THE BmExErr OF THIRD PERsONs (1939). In Mellen
v. Whipple, 67 Mass. 317 (1854), it was said that in only three situations might third
party beneficiaries enforce a contract: (1) where A gives money to B to pay A's cred-
itors and B agrees, (2) where the promise is made for the benefit of a nephew or child
of the promisee, and (3) where a lessee assigns to an assignee who agrees to pay the
rent; cf. Baurer v. Devenes, 99 Conn. 203, 121 AtI. 566 (1923). In the Mdlen case,
supra, a mortgagee sought to recover on the mortgage debt in a direct action at law
against the assuming grantee. The court stated that "The plaintiff's claim is not sup-
ported by any known decision of any court." There were no mortgage cases of the simple
debt type in the Court of Appeals before Lawrence v. Fox. 4 Cona. L. Q., supra, at 55.
Despite the foregoing, the beneficiary of a life insurance policy probably could always
recover, 2 WI.LIsToN, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 369, as could a mortgagee holding
fire insurance for his security, id. at § 401-A. Recovery by third parties has been per-
mitted on contractor's surety bonds and public contracts. See Corbin, Third Parties as
Beneficiaries of Contractors' Surety Bonds (1928) 38 YALIE L. J. 1; Corbin, Liability
of Water Companies for Losses by Fire (1910) 19 YAixn L. J. 425; Comment (1919) 4
CoRN. L. Q. 53, 58-59.
68. Comment (1919) 4 CORN. L. 0. 53, 54; FiNLAY, CoNTMcrs FoR Tn BENEFr
OF TH I PERsoNs (1939) 12 et seq., 32, 50.
69. Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N. Y. 280, 284 (1877); Pardee v. Treat, 82 N. Y. 385,
392 (1880); Wheat v. Rice, 97 N. Y. 296, 301 (1884); Durnherr v. Rau, 135 N. Y.
219, 222, 223, 32 N. E. 49, 50 (1892).
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against the assuming grantee, a result which the court admitted could
not have been reached under the doctrine of equitable subrogation.70 Next
came Thorp v. Keokuk Coal Co., involving a mortgage which expressly
limited the mortgagor's liability ,to the amount of a deficiency after a
foreclosure sale. The grantee had assumed the mortgage without quali-
fication and was held liable for the full amount of the mortgage debt.
In a dictum, the court stated that the mortgagee could enforce the
grantee's assumption even if the grantor were not liable.71 The narrower
doctrine, however, appeared again in the later case of Simpson v. Brown,
in which the court said:
"But it is not every promise made by one to another, from the
performance of which a benefit may ensue to a third, which gives a
right of action to such third person, he being neither privy to the
contract nor to the consideration. The contract must be made for
his benefit as its object, and he must be the party intended to be
benefited." 7
2
In Vrooman v. Turner71 the Thorp dictum was overruled by a square
holding that a mortgagee may not enforce the grantee's assumption unless
his immediate grantor was liable- a result identical with that reached
under equitable subrogation. The rule of this case expressly requires
an intent by the promisee to secure a benefit to the third party and makes
it clear, at least in the mortgage cases, that the mortgagee must be a
creditor, rather than a donee, beneficiary. Where the grantor is an heir
or devisee of the mortgagor and subject to a limited statutory liability
for payment of the mortgagor's debts measured by the assets received, 4
70. 24 N. Y. 178, 179 (1861); see Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 610, 620 (1890).
71. 48 N. Y. 253, 257 (1872); see Ritter v. Phillips, 53 N. Y. 586 (1873).
72. 68 N. Y. 355, 361-362 (1877).
73. 69 N. Y. 280 (1877) ; and see Notes (1921) 12 A. L. R. 1528, 1532, (1922) 21
A. L. R. 439. Outside New York the cases are hopelessly at variance. Corbin, Con-
tracts for the Benefit of Third Persons (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 1008, 1015,
That the grantor initially acquired title subject to the mortgage is immaterial. Any
subsequent assumption by the grantor during his ownership will render his grantee's
assumption enforceable. Wager v. Link, 134 N. Y. 122, 31 N. E. 213 (1892); Howard
v. Robbins, 67 App. Div. 245, 73 N. Y. Supp. 172 (4th Dcp't 1901), aff'd, 170 N. Y.
498, 63 N. E. 530 (1902). There is some suggestion that the grantee's assumption is
enforceable if the grantor were legally or equitably liable. See cases discussed in Ross
v. Davis, 138 Misc. 863, 865, 248 N. Y. Supp. 441, 443 (Sup. Ct. 1931); Corbin, Con-
tracts for the Benefit of Third Persons (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 1008, 1028. But the mort-
gage cases do not seem to furnish authority for this statement. See Durnherr v. Rau,
135 N. Y. 219, 222, 32 N. E. 49 (1892). The grantee's assumption is effective between
grantor and grantee even if unenforceable by the mortgagee under Vrooman v. Turner.
Brenner v. Ebbets-McKeever Exhibition Co., 256 App.- Div. 980, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 323
(2d Dep't 1939).
74. N. Y. DEM. EsT. LAW §§ 170-176.
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the grantor is sufficiently liable within this requirement.7" The burden
of establishing the grantor's liability rests on the mortgagee.
The requirement that the promise be made for the direct benefit of
the mortgagee has been developed in a group of cases holding that the
mortgagee can enforce the assumption only where in equity the mortgage
debt is intended to become the debt of the grantee - i.e., where the con-
tracting parties intend that as between them there is to be a substitution
of liability." The courts accordingly hold that if the conveyance is not
absolute, the mortgagee can not enforce the grantee's assumption,7" and
that where the conveyance is only for the purpose of security, amounting
to an equitable mortgage,7 or where the assumption is by a junior mort-
gagee,"0 there is no assumption of the debt but merely an agreement to
make advances on the security of the land, with a right of subrogation
in the senior lien by way of security. Such an agreement is regarded
as benefiting the mortgagor alone, and the mortgagee is regarded as
having no enforceable interest despite the incidental benefit accruing to
him through performance. 8' Likewise, a conveyance to an assignee for
benefit of creditors does not render the assignee liable for a deficiency
judgment."2 Application of equitable subrogation would have impelled
the same results in these cases.
It is clear then, under the decisions following Lawrence z,. Fox, that
the right of a creditor beneficiary must be predicated upon an agreement
made for his benefit.8 3 It has been argued that the mortgagor-grantor
75. Floyd v. Clark, 1 Mo. L. Bul. 55, 62 (N. Y. Comm. P1. 1879); see Genesee
Valley Nat. Bank v. Bolton, 248 App. Div. 530, 532, 290 N. Y. Supp. 913 (4th Dept
1936).
76. Bennett v. Bates, 94 N. Y. 354 (1884).
77. Pardee v. Treat, 82 N. Y. 385, 388-389 (1880); Safford v. Levin, 149 'Misc
384, 387, 266 N. Y. Supp. 687, 689 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
78. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) §387; 1 WiLT iE, MorrGAGE Fo.e-
cLosuREs (5th ed. 1939) §§ 239, 240.
79. Garnsey v. Rogers, 47 N. Y. 233 (1872) ; Pardee v. Treat, 82 N. Y. 385 (1880);
Root v. Wright, 84 N. Y. 72 (1881); Cole v. Cole, 110 N. Y. 630, 17 N. E. 682 (18M).
But cf. Campbell v. Smith, 71 N. Y. 26 (1877).
80. Safford v. Levin, 149 Misc. 384, 266 N. Y. Supp. 687 (Sup. Ct. 1932). The
result differed where a junior mortgagee agreed to pay a prior mortgage, deducted its
amount from the proceeds of the loan and remitted only the balance to the mortgagor.
See Miller v. Winchell, 70 N. Y. 437, 439 (1877). The Miller case holds that a grantee
taking a warranty deed subject to the prior mortgage could not enforce the covenant. But
cf. Baurer v. Devenes, 99 Conn. 203, 121 At. 566 (1923).
81. Pardee v. Treat, 82 N. Y. 385, 388 (1880).
82. First Nat. Bank v. Wilson, 130 Misc. 652, 225 N. Y. Supp. 146 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
83. An incidental beneficiary has no enforceable rights against the promisor. Simp-
son v. Brown, 68 N. Y. 355 (1877); Durnherr v. Rau, 135 N. Y. 219, 32 N. E. 49
(1892); 2 WIL.ISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 369; Corbin, Contracts for the
Benefit of Third Persons (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 1008, 1017-1018; .sETATA' E:;NT, Co:4-
TRACrS (1932) § 147.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
requires the assumption from the grantee not for the benefit of the niort-
gagee but for his own advantage, 4 an argument which in most cases
would bar the mortgagee from enforcement of the assumption. Pro-
fessor Corbin has answered this by pointing out that the contract itself
has no intent. The parties have intents, but their intents are never the
same. The grantor bargains for a discharge of his obligation by the
grantee- a matter of benefit to himself as well as to his creditor. The
intended benefit is an entirety, not susceptible of division into primary
and incidental purposes.8 5 It now seems certain that the mortgagee is
a party "benefited" by the grantee's assumption by deed.
Outside of New York, the American states are split on whether the
mortgagee has a direct cause of action at law or must proceed tinder
equitable subrogation. The great weight of authority permits an action
at law.86 Precise classification of the states is difficult, and is not attempted
here, because of the growing tendency of equity states to shift to the
law doctrine,8 7 thereby outdating many of the decisions. The situation
is also confused by the prevalence of both doctrines simultaneously in
some jurisdictions, s and by the fact that identical results are frequently
reached regardless of the purported theory."
Nevertheless, neither group maintains a consistent uniformity with
respect to the power of the mortgagor to release the mortgagee's rights.
The confusion is compounded in New York because of uncertainty as
to which theory is to be applied." Holdings that under equitable subro-
84. See Douglass v. Wells, 18 Hun. 88, 95 (3d Dep't 1879) ; Keller v. Ashford, 133
U. S. 610, 621-622 (1890) ; 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) §§361, 380; 3 TI'-
FANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 623; FINLAY, CONTRACTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF
THIRD PERSONS (1939) 59; Glassie. The Assuming Vendee (1923) 9 VA. L. REv. 196,
199; Comment (1910) 10 COL. L. Rv. 765, 766.
85. Corbin, Third Parties as Beneficiaries of Contractors' Surety Bonds (1928) 38
YALE L. J. 1, 7-8; see Durnherr v. Rau, 135 N. Y. 219, 221, 32 N. E. 49, 50 (1892).
86. See Hubard v. Thacker, 132 Va. 33, 40, 110 S. E. 263, 266 (1922) ; 2 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) §361; 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) §623;
Glassie, The Assuming Vendee (1923) 9 VA. L. REv. 196, 198; (1934) 47 HARY. L. REV.
1065; (1925) 9 MINN. L. REV. 295, 296.
87. Professor Williston's statement that the overwhelming majority of American
courts support a direct action by the creditor (2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936)
§ 361) does not appear in his 1920 edition.
88. Comment (1939) 25 VA. L. REv. 993, 996; see note 90 infra.
89. See Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons in the Federal Courts
(1930) 39 YALE L. J. 601, 606; cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Maxwell, 89 F. (2d) 988, 995
(C. C. A. 4th, 1937).
90. While Gifford v. Corrigan, 117 N. Y. 257, 264, 22 N. E. 756, 758 (1889), states
that the law doctrine has absorbed the equitable "in a broader equity," Wager v. Link,
134 N. Y. 122, 31 N. E. 213 (1896) refers to both doctrines as apparently of equal
standing. Compare Bennett v. Bates, 94 N. Y. 354, 370 (1884). Wicks v. Carmichael,
172 Misc. 924, 927, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 395, 399 (Sup. Ct. 1939), indicates that equitable
subrogation may be the New York theory. Comment (1927) 13 CORN. L. Q. 123, 126
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gation the mortgagee's right is to the security existing at the time of
the action"' should impel the conclusion that a release is valid at any
time prior to the inception of the mortgagee's action. 2 Rulings that this
result obtains except where the mortgagee has acted in reliance in the
interim, where fraud against the mortgagee has occurred, or where the
release constitutes a fraudulent conveyance, 3 do not militate against this
conclusion but merely cloud the result with extraneous, though prevailing,
factors. Any requirement in the equity states that the mortgagee "accept"
the assumption cannot be reconciled with the theory that does not even
require the mortgagee to know of the collateral security's existence. Some
of these states rule that dealings between mortgagee and grantee" or
mere payments of interest by the grantee" render the mortgagee's rights
indefeasible. Other jurisdictions rule that payments are insufficient. 0
It has been suggested that a reconveyance by the grantee to his grantor
is no different from a conveyance by the grantee to a third person,"7 but
this is not true in an equity state if in the reconveyance the original
obligor again assumes the mortgage, for the priority of liability is now
reversed and the entire equitable subrogation set-up unraveled."
A few of the law states hold that the mortgagee's right becomes in-
defeasible immediately upon the assumption," but the majority rule
(citing Wager v. Links, supra, and Calvo v. Davies, 73 N. Y. 211 (1878)), submits that
the equitable rule still obtains in New York with the addition of a contract right in the
mortgagee. Calvo v. Davies is not in point as it merely holds that a modification of a
mortgage made between the holder and an assuming grantee discharges the mortgagor
from personal liability because of prejudice to the mortgagor's right of "subrogation."
The reference there is to the mortgagor-former owner's right against the mortgaged
premises, after payment of the mortgage debt, and not to the mortgagor's collateral
security, as the term "equitable subrogation" connotes.
91. Biddell v. Brizzolara, 64 Cal. 354, 361, 30 Pac. 609 (1883) ; Crowell v. Currier,
27 N. J. Eq. 152, 156 (1876), aff'd sub. non. Crowell v. Hospital of St. Barnabas, 27
N. J. Eq. 650, 656 (1876).
92. See 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 623; Comment (1910) 10 COL
L. REv. 765, 767; Comment (1927) 13 CORN. L. Q. 123, 125; (1934) 47 HAnv. L REv.
1065. But cf. Gifford v. Corrigan, 117 N. Y. 257, 264-265, 22 N. E. 756, 758 (1889).
93. Field v. Thistle, 58 N. J. Eq. 339 (1899); 3 TirFANY, RLAL PtO',"M (2d ed.
1920) § 623.
94. Hubard v. Thacker, 132 Va. 33, 110 S. E. 263 (1922); Hill v. Hoeldtke, 104
Tex. 594, 142 S. W. 871 (1912); see Clark v. -isk, 9 Utah 94, 33 Pac. 248 (1893).
95. Betts v. Drew, 3 Fed. Cas. No. 1372 at 317 (C. C. N. D. III. 1879).
96. Stephens v. Casbacker, 8 Hun. 116 (4th Dep't 1876).
97. Starbird v. Cranston, 24 Colo. 20, 48 Pac. 652 (1897); Comment (1927) 13
CORN. L. Q. 123, 125.
98. Crowell v. Currier, 27 N. J. Eq. 152 (1876), aff'd sub. noa. Crowell v. Hos-
pital of St. Barnabas, 27 N. J. Eq. 650 (1876); see Wallace v. Hammonds, 170 Ark.
952, 281 S. W. 902 (1926). But cf. Hubard v. Thacker, 132 Va. 33, 110 S. E. 263 (1922)
(deed to mortgagor after intermediate conveyances).
99. Starbird v. Cranston, 24 Colo. 20, 48 Pac. 652 (1897); Bay v. Williams, 112 Ill.
91, 1 N. E. 340 (1884) ; Hill v. Hoeldtke, 104 Te. 594, 142 S. IV. 871 (1912).
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requires acceptance or adoption by the mortgagee before deeming the
right vested.' The institution of an action clearly satisfies this require-
ment. 1' In New York it has been said that, while the institution of an
action is conclusive evidence of acceptance, any clear manifestation of
intention short of a lawsuit is sufficient." 2 The Court of Appeals has,
however, never defined such manifestation."' The lower New York
courts conflict squarely on whether the grantor has any power to re-
lease,104 and stray statements by the Court of Appeals, some of them
hardly meriting the dignity of the term dictum, are in irreconcilable con-
flict.' 0 5
The requirement that the mortgagee must accept or adopt the assump-
tion cannot be reconciled to the view of the majority in Lawrence v. Fox
that acceptance is presurmed until dissent is shown. 10 If it be assumed
100. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Aitkin, 125 N. Y. 660, 26 N. E. 732 (1891); Betts v.
Drew, 3 Fed. Cas. No. 1372 at 317 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1879); Wallace v. Hammonds, 170
Ark. 952, 281 S. W. 902 (1926); Carnahan v. Tousey, 93 Ind. 561 (1883); U. S. Fi.
delity & Guar. Co. v. R. I. Covering Co., 53 R. 1. 397, 167 AtI. 143 (1933) (mortgagee
need not know of assumption when made) ; Clark v. Fisk, 9 Utah 94, 33 Pac. 248 (1893) ;
3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 623; Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of
Third Persons (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 1008, 1023; Comment (1910) 10 Coi.. L, Rav. 765,
766-767; Comment (1927) 13 CoRN. L. Q. 123, 124; Note (1922) 21 A. L. R. 439, 462;
see Thorp v. Keokuk Coal Co., 48 N. Y. 253, 257 (1872); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
(1932) § 143; but see Douglas v. Wells, 18 Hun. 88, 92 (3d Dep't 1879),
101. Gifford v. Corrigan, 117 N. Y. 257, 22 N. E. 756 (1889); N. Y. Life Ins, Co.
v. Aitkin, 125 N. Y. 660, 26 N. E. 732 (1891) ; Whiting v. Gearty, 14 Hun. 498 (N. Y.
1878); Comment (1927) 13 CORx. L. Q. 123, 124.
102. Gifford v. Corrigan, 117 N. Y. 257, 263, 22 N. E. 756, 757-758 (1889); Carnahan
v. Tousey, 93 Ind. 561, 564 (1883).
103. See Morales v. Joanou, 146 Misc. 515, 517, 262 N. Y. Supp. 468, 470 (Sup. Ct.
1933); Comment (1927) 13 CoRN. L. Q. 123, 125.
104. No power to release: Ranney v. McMullen, 5 Abb. N. C. 246 (1878); Doug-
lass v. Wells, 18 Hun. 88 (3d Dep't 1879); Ellis v. Kristofersen, 129 Misc. 443, 222 N.
Y. Supp. 370 (Sup. Ct. 1927), 13 CORN. L. Q. 123; and see Londner v. Perlman, 129
App. Div. 93, 113 N. Y. Supp. 420 (1st Dep't 1908); 1 WILTSIF, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURaS
(5th ed. 1939) §235. Contra: Stephens v. Casbacker, 8 Hun. 116 (4th Dep't 1876). A
release, ineffective against the mortgagee, may be good inter partes, its effect being to
rearrange the priority of liability. Field v. Thistle, 58 N. J. Eq. 339 (1899).
105. See McCarthy v. Pieret, 281 N. Y. 407, 410, 24 N. E. (2d) 102, 103 (1939);
Hartley v. Harrison, 24 N. Y. 170, 172 (1861); Bennett v. Bates, 94 N. Y. 354, 370
(1884); Judson v. Dada, 79 N. Y. 373, 379 (1880); Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v.
Nelson, 78 N. Y. 137, 153 (1879) ; Garnsey v. Rogers, 47 N. Y. 233, 242 (1872); com-
pare comment on the Garnsey case by Learned, P. J., dissenting in Douglass v. Wells,
18 Hun. 88, 98 (3d Dep't 1879) with remarks in Crowell v. Hospital of St. Barnabas,
27 N. J. Eq. 650, 657 (1876).
106. 20 N. Y. 268, 274-275 (1859). Only four judges concurred in this holding.
Clearly distinguishable are cases holding that if the assumption agreement is not based
on new consideration and amounts only to a direction of the creditor to his debtor to
pay the former's debt to a third person, the direction may be revoked before it is acted
upon. Comley v. Dazian, 114 N. Y. 161 (1889); Wheat v. Rice, 97 N. Y. 296, 302
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that the promisee is an "agent" of the beneficiary, as the concurring judges
in Lawrence v. Fox felt,107 or that the assent of the beneficiary is the
acceptance of an offer,10 8 it would follow that the beneficiary has the
power of ratifying or disaffirming- though it is difficult to understand
why he should disaffirm. If the relationship is assimilated to a trust or
an insurance policy without power to change the beneficiary, a contrary
result would follow. But it is foolish to invoke an analogy arbitrarily
and then complain if the results under observation fail to conform in
every respect to the analogy chosen. It is submitted that no fetish should
be made of the mortgagee's "acceptance," particularly in those communi-
ties where it is the general practice to let mortgages run past due if taxes
and interest are paid.' 9
Professor Corbin writes persuasively that the relationship is contrac-
tual and based on offer, acceptance and consideration, all of which occur
between the promisor and promisee.1 0 In view of the fact that these
are completed on the making of the promise, it seems to follow logically
that the mortgagee's rights become indefeasible at that time."' Professor
Corbin stops short of this conclusion -properly so, because the weight
of authority fails to sustain it." One difficulty in reaching a satisfactory
conclusion is the paucity of judicial analysis of the basis upon which
Lawrence v. Fox rests." 3 With questionable analysis which disregards
the growth of the law, it has been regarded as a legal saltation that fails
to fit snugly into any pre-existing legal categories."" In some respects
(1884); Trimble v. Strother, 25 Ohio St. 378 (1874); see Carnahan v. Tousey, 93 Ind.
561, 565 (1883). Cf. 'May v. Nat. Bank of Malone, 9 Hun. 103 (3d Dep't 1876), aff'd,
73 N. Y. 599 (1878).
107. 20 N. Y. 268, 275 (1859), disapproved in Gifford v. Corrigan, 117 N. Y. 257,
263, 22 N. E. 756, 758 (1889); Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons
(1918) 27 YA. L. J. 1008, 1009. Logical extension of the agency theory would prevent
the promisee from participating in the contract in his own right.
108. Disapproved in Corbin, Contracts for the Bcnefit of Third Persons (1918) 27
YALE L. J. 1008, 1020.
109. See Union Trust Co. v. Kaplan, 249 App. Div. 280, 284, 292 N. Y. Supp. 152,
159 (4th Dep't 1936) (judicial knowledge of custom).
110. Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons (1918) 27 YAI.n L J. 1003,
1020.
111. 3 TiFFANY, REAL PRorEaRY (2d ed. 1920) §623; Comment (1910) 10 Co- L.
REV. 765, 766; Comment (1927) 13 CORN. L. Q. 123, 126; note the bootstrap argument
in 3 POMFaoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 1206 n. 3.
112. See Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N. Y. 280, 285 (1877); cf. Elliott, C. J. dissenting
in Carnahan v. Tousey, 93 Ind. 561, 568, 569 (1883). For the rise and fall of agency
and trust theories in England see FixLAY, CoNTRAcTS FOR THE Br-=T oF TrmD
PEasoxs (1939) 12 et seq., 20 et seq., 32, 50.
113. For the tortuous groping of the English courts toward relief for third party
beneficiaries, see Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons (1930) 46 L. Q.
REv. 12, 19 et seq.; FILAY, CoNTRAcTs FOR THE BENEFITFo0 THMn PEmso-s (1939).
114. See Comment (1910) 10 CoL L. REv. 765, 766; FINLAY, Co RcCTS FOn THE
BENEFIT OF THnUw PERsoNs (1939) 1.
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the same might be said for Lumley v. Gye" 5 and Luinley v. Wagner,"0
but Lawrence v. Fox, when applied to mortgages, differs from these.
Once Lawrence v. Fox had been decided, it was difficult on logical grounds
to exclude the mortgagee from its operation. There is no strong public
policy, however, behind helping the mortgagee who has admittedly picked
up an unexpected windfall." 7 Some have sought to distinguish a mort-
gagee from other creditor beneficiaries on the ground that there is no
fund in the hands of the promisor for his payment" 8 but there is no
basis for distinguishing between delivery of money and land." 9 The
Restatement of Contracts set forth a general conclusion which merely re-
capitulates uncritically the majority rule.' 0
INCIDENTS OF LIABILITY UNDER A MORTGAGE
After-acquired personal property clauses. The degree of liability under-
taken is measured by the terms of the mortgage or contract of assump-
tion.' And liability under a mortgage and all its covenants includes
115. 2 El. & B1. 216 (Q. B. 1853).
116. 1 DeG., M. & G. 604 (1852).
117. See (1934) 47 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1066. But cf. CoNN. GEN. STAT. (1930)
§ 5489.
118. See Learned, P. J. dissenting in Douglas v. Wells, 18 Hun. 88, 98 (3d Dep't
1879) ; Comment (1919) 4 CORN. L. Q. 53, 55.
119. Wager v. Link, 134 N. Y. 122, 127, 31 N. E. 213, 215 (1896); Garnsey v.
Rogers, 47 N. Y. 233, 238-239 (1872); Comstock v. Drohan, 71 N. Y. 9, 13 (1877);
Betts v. Drew, 3 Fed. Gas. No. 1372 at 317 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1879).
120. RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTS (1932) § 143 reads:
"A discharge of the promisor by the promisee in a contract or variation
thereof by them is effective against a creditor beneficiary if,
(a) the creditor beneficiary does not bring suit upon the promise or other-
wise materially change his position in reliance thereon before he knows
of the discharge or variation, and
(b) the promissee's action is not a fraud on creditors."
This Section is followed in Berger & Son v. Duys, N. Y. L. J. Aug. 31, 1939, p. 510,
col. 5 (Sup. Ct. 1939), s.c., N. Y. L. J. Sept. 18, 1940, p. 679, col. 1; accord, Willard v.
Worsham, 76 Va. 392 (1882); see New York Life Ins. Co. v. Aitkin, 125 N. Y. 660,
670, 26 N. E. 732, 734 (1891) (equitable subrogation); Field v. Thistle, 58 N. J. Eq.
339 (1899); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 623.
121. The liability agreement must be clear. Ross v. Davis, 138 Misc. 863, 864;
248 N. Y. Supp. 441, 443 (Sup. Ct. 1931); Scholten v. Barber, 217 Ill. 148, 75 N. E.
460 (1905). A person liable on a mortgage is liable only in accordance with his
covenant. First Nat. Bank v. Wilson, 130 Misc. 652, 653, 225 N. Y. Supp. 146, 147
(Sup. Ct. 1927) ; Notes (1922) 21 A. L. R. 439, 469 et seq.; L. R. A. 1917C. 593, 596.
Liability for interest does not imply liability for principal. Manhattan Life Ins. Co.
v. Crawford, 9 Abb. N. C. 365 (Sup. Ct. 1879). Liability on the mortgage debt itself
does not mean liability on the other covenants in the mortgage. Silverstein v. Brown,
153 App. Div. 677, 138 N. Y. Supp. 848 (1st Dep't 1912). The general rule that exec-
utors and trustees incur an individual liability by making contracts in the absence of a
disclaimer (O'Brien v. Jackson, 167 N. Y. 31, 40, 60 N. E. 238, 239 (1901); RESTATE-
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more than a liability for principal and interest. An important incidental
aspect is the relation of assumption to the after-acquired personal property
clauses generally appearing in New York mortgages. The lien of a real
property mortgage covers fixtures installed at the inception of a mort-
gage, as well as those subsequently affixed. 1 2 In the absence of special
provision, however, it does not cover personal property used in connection
with the realty.' 3  Despite the marked growth in the use of personal
property as the regular equipment of buildings, especially urban struc-
tures, the inelastic common law concept of fixtures excludes it from the
scope of the usual real property mortgage lien.124 Personal property
clauses have been added to mortgages to include in the security for the
debt personal property essential for the operation of the realty which
would otherwise be removable. This practice is recognized by statute
and a special provision permits the single recordation of this type of
mortgage in the real property records without the necessity of filing
and refiling as a separate chattel mortgage." Insofar as the personal
property clause purports to include after-acquired property, doctrinal
considerations limit its effect to those persons liable on the mortgage.
Theoretically, a mortgage on future property creates no present lien
and is but an affirmative covenant to give a mortgage in the future.
Like many affirmative covenants it does not run with the land but binds
only the mortgagor and grantees who have assumed the covenant in
question.'' 6
.Ecr, TRUSTS (1935) §§ 261-263) regardless of a recital of representative capacity
(Schmittler v. Simon, 101 N. Y. 554, 5 N. E. 452 (1886); Darling v. Powell, 20 .Misc.
240, 45 N. Y. Supp. 794 (Sup. Ct. 1897)) is applied to mortgage assumptions. Olin v.
Arendt, 27 Misc. 270, 57 N. Y. Supp. 473 (Sup. Ct. 1899) ; Smith v. Wagner, 106 Misc.
170, 174 N. Y. Supp. 205 (Sup. Ct. 1919) ; East River Savings Bank v. 245 Broadway
Corp., 170 Misc. 779, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 927 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 257 App. Div. 940,
13 N. Y. S. (2d) 102 (1st Dep't 1939); s.c., N. Y. L. J. Nov. 22, 1939, p. 1753, col. 5.
(Sup. Ct. 1939); see Matter of Daufkirch, 145 Misc. 396, 261 N. Y. Supp. 69 (Surr.
Ct. 1932). But cf. City Bank v. Frankenfelder, 166 Misc. 63, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 357 (Sup.
Ct 1937).
122. Gates v. De La Mare, 142 N. Y. 307, 37 N. E. 121 (1894); Curry v. Geier
Const. Co., 225 App. Div. 498, 234 N. Y. Supp. 59 (2d Dep't 19279).
123. McKeage v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 38 (1880); Cosgrove v. Troescher,
62 App. Div. 123, 70 N. Y. Supp. 764 (1st Dep't 1901); Cutler Mail Shute Co. v.
Crawford, 167 App. Div. 246, 152 N. Y. Supp. 750 (1st Dep't 1915) (deed).
124. As there is no relevant statute, the definition of fixtures must be suught in the
cases. lit re Walker Bin Co., 9 F. Supp. 367 (W. D. N. Y. 1935).
125. N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW §254. N. Y. LEN LAW §231; Zartman v. First Nat.
Bank, 189 N. Y. 267, 82 N. E. 127 (1907).
126. Guaranty Trust Co. v. New York & Q. C. Ry., 253 N. Y. 190, 170 N. E. 887
(1930); Newbrook Realty Co. v. Frigidaire Sales Corp., N. Y. L. J. Oct. 6, 1936,
p. 1026, col. 6 (N. Y. City Ct.); see authorities collected in Foley & Pogue, After-
acquired Property Under Conflicting Mortgage Indentures (1929) 13 MiNN. L REV.
81, 85 n. 17, and DOUGLAS & SHANKS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS UNITS:
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Fire Insurance. Liability under a mortgage also affects the rights of
mortgagor and mortgagee in fire insurance covering the mortgaged
premises. A mortgagor's liability for payment of the mortgage debt in
itself gives the mortgagee no rights in the proceeds of fire policies.
127
The usual mortgage includes an express covenant by the mortgagor to
insure for the benefit of the mortgagee, which is effected by delivery
of policies endorsed for payment to the mortgagee. 128 Even though the
mortgagor breaches this clause, its mere presence gives the mortgagee
an equitable lien on the proceeds of policies procured by the mortgagor
for his own benefit. 2 ' Although this rule applies to an assuming grantee,
it does not reach a grantee subject to the mortgage on the ground that
the insurance clause is a personal and collateral covenant that does not
run with the land.'8 0
Order of Priorities. Liability on a mortgage may rearrange the order
of priorities in the premises. Two types of liability are involved: liability
for the debt and liability on the covenants and warranties. There are
several types of cases in which the problem of a shift in priorities is likely
to arise. One class is predicated upon the rule which bars a mortgagor
from claiming a right paramount to the *mortgage, as against his own
mortgagee. An owner may preserve the lien of a mortgage after its
payment, where rights of creditors and others have not intervened,0 1
and reissue the mortgage to a third person, but its priority as a lien
thereafter dates from the reissue rather than from its original recorda-
tion.132 An owner, by executing a mortgage, thereby subordinates any
prior mortgage he may then own or may subsequently acquire on the
FINANCE (1931) 27 n., 51 n., 52 n., et seq. See generally Friedman, The Scope of
Mortgage Liens on Fixtures and Personal Property in New York (1938) 7 FORDHAm L.
REV. 331.
127. Carter v. Rockett, 8 Paige 437 (N. Y. 1840).
128. For the construction of mortgagee endorsement, see Savarese v. Ohio Farmers
Ins.* Co., 260 N. Y. 45, 182 N. E. 665 (1932)., (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 788, (1932) 32
COL. L. REv. 1438; Note (1934) 91 A. L. R. 1354. See generally Comment (1933) 33
COL. L. REv. 305.
129. Cromwell v. Brooklyn Fire Ins. Co., 44 N. Y. 42 (1870); Dunlop v. Avery,
89 N. Y. 593 (1882); Greenberg v. 1625 Putnam Ave. Corp., 241 App. Div. 623,
268 N. Y. Supp. 553 (2d Dep't 1934).
130. Reid v. McCrum, 91 N. Y. 412 (1883); Dunlop v. Avery, 89 N. Y. 593 (1882);
Sheehan v. Spring Valley Prod. Corp., 194 App. Div. 119, 185 N. Y. Supp. 641 (2d
Dep't 1920), aff'd, 233 N. Y. 561, 135 N. E. 918 (1922).
131. Salvin v. Myles Realty Co., 227 N. Y. 51, 124 N. E. 94 (1919); Champney
v. Coope, 32 N. Y. 543 (1865); cf. Slote v. Cascade Holding Corp., 276 N. Y. 239,
11 N. E. (2d) 894 (1937).
132. Sherow v. Livingston, 22 App. Div. 530, 48 N. Y. Supp. 269 (2d Dep't 1897).
But if the mortgage has been paid with the object of cancellation, upon a reissue and
in the absence of an estoppel, it will be subordinated to a mortgage given after the
reissue. Bogert v. Bliss, 148 N. Y. 194, 42 N. E. 582 (1896).
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same premises. 33 This subordination binds the owner, his assignees, and
those claiming through him.3 The result is based either on a theory of
liability that a man cannot prefer a mortgage he owns, as well as owes,
over a mortgage he owes but does not own,"'3 or on merger ;'3 but the
cases place no stress on the warranties of title usually included in the
mortgage.
Liability for the debt alone affects priorities where guaranteed mort-
gages are involved. During the boom, part interests in mortgages were
often sold to the public. Other interests went unsold or were reacquired by
the mortgage companies. The companies, which were not parties to the
mortgages or the covenants in them contained, accompanied the public
sale with a guaranty of principal and interest. While there are several
rules of priority respecting successive assignees of part interests in mort-
gages,' the Court of Appeals has taken the position that, in the absence
of contractual provisions to the contrary, any participations in the hands
of the guarantor are subordinate to those held by the public. This posi-
tion has been based upon presumed intent, "special equities 2"8 and on
"the underlying principle . . . that a mortgage company which
sells participating certificates in a mortgage and itself guarantees
133. Gillig v. Maass, 28 N. Y. 191, 210-211 (1863); Williams v. Thorne, 11 Paige
459, 464-465 (N. Y. 1845); Conlon v. Minor, 94 App. Div. 458, 88 N. Y. Supp. 224
(1st Dep't 1904); Sherow v. Livingston, 22 App. Div. 530, 48 N. Y. Supp. 269 (2d
Dep't 1897) ; Quackenbush v. Quackenbush, 130 Misc. 738, 225 N. Y. Supp. 152 (Sup.
Ct. 1927); Hudson City Say. Inst. v. McArthur, 8 N. Y. Wkly. Dig. 63 (Sup. Ct.
1879). But cf. Clark v. Rowell, 163 Misc. 777, 298 N. Y. Supp. 232 (County Ct. 1937).
If the mortgagor's grantee assumes the mortgage, he may not after acquiring the bond
and mortgage enforce the indebtedness against the mortgagor-grantor, since, by taking
the assignment, he became the owner of the demand he had bound himself to satisfy.
Ely v. McNight, 30 How. Pr. 97 (Sup. Ct. 1864). In Russell v. Pistor, 7 N. Y. 171
(1852) it was held that a sale of part of mortgaged premises to an assuming grantee
made the part sold primarily responsible for the mortgage and that a subsequent grantee
of the part sold, though not personally liable on the mortgage, could not after taking
an assignment enforce the mortgage against the part not sold.
134. Williams v. Thorne, 11 Paige 459, 464-465 (N. Y. 1845); see cases cited note
133 supra.
135. Quackenbush v. Quackenbush, 130 Misc. 738, 225 N. Y. Supp. 152 (Sup. Ct.
1927).
136. Sherow v. Livingston, 22 App. Div. 530, 48 N. Y. Supp. 269 (2d Dep't 1897).
But merger has been held not to occur unless the person responsible for the whole mort-
gage debt is seized of the entire property. Clark v. Rowell, 163 Misc. 777, 298 N. Y.
Supp. 232 (County Ct 1937) ; cf. Matter of Grieco, 172 Misc. 723, 725 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
An owner, by acquiring and reassigning a mortgage, may estop himself to claim mer-
ger. Thorburn v. Wende, 235 App. Div. 424, 257 N. Y. Supp. 186 (4th Dep't 1932).
137. 3 Pou-moy, EQuiry JuRisPRuDENcE (4th ed. 1918) §§ 1200-1203; Note (1927)
50 A. L. R. 543.
138. Matter of Title & Mortgage Guar. Co., 275 N. Y. 347, 9 N. E. (2d) 957 (1937),
(1938) 47 YALE L. J. 480, (1937) 37 CoL L. Ray. 1010.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
them is in the position of a debtor, and the equitable rule existing
between debtors and creditors applies."' 3 9
The court has expressly denied that its rule is to avoid circuity of ac-
tion.14 A New Jersey court, however, has maintained that this rule is only
to avoid circuity, and no longer obtains when the guarantor is insol-
vent.14  It has applied the pro rata rule in a struggle between secured
and general creditors of the guarantor. The court found that the par-
ticipants had no expectation of priority over other participants or the
guarantor, that the guarantor had not made its own share an additional
security, and that the unsold balance of the mortgage or other assets
of the guarantor had neither been assigned nor intended to be assigned.
In a third type of case, the authorities stress the mortgagor's war-
ranties of title to the virtual exclusion of his liability for the debt. It is
generally held that a mortgage purporting to convey a definite estate
with warranties estops the mortgagor or an assuming grantee from
asserting an after-acquired title or interest, which the mortgage purports
to convey, against the mortgagee.or those claiming under him, including
a purchaser at a foreclosure sale. The subsequently-acquired title is held
to vest in the mortgagee by estoppel.142 Without warranties there is no
estoppel despite the mortgagor's liability for the debt. 4  Nevertheless,
there is authority for the proposition that a representation in the mort-
gage of the ownership of a precise estate will suffice in the absence of
a warranty 44 -a result which realizes the intentions of the parties
without exalting the technical distinction between representations and
warranties. Warranties are not uniform - some may be special or limited
-and distinctions are predicated upon their variations. 141 A warranty
against claims by the mortgagor or his successors excludes an after-
acquired title obtained from an outsider. 46 But the title of a mortgagee
by estoppel is subject to pre-existing liens and liens created to secure
139. Pink v. Thomas, 282 N. Y. 10, 12, 24 N. E. (2d) 724, 725 (1939).
140. Matter of Title & Mortgage Guar. Co., 275 N. Y. 347, 354, 9 N. E. (2d) 957,
959 (1937).
141. Kelly v. Middlesex Title Guar. Co., 115 N. J. Eq. 592, 171 Ati. 823 (1934),
aff'd, 116 N. J. Eq. 574, 174 Atl. 706 (1934).
142. Tefft v. Munson, 57 N. Y. 97 (1874); Vanderheyden v. Crandall, 2 Den. 9
(1846), aff'd, 1 N. Y. 491 (1848) ; Note (1929) 58 A. L. R. 345, 350 ct seq.
143. Douglas v. Cruger, 80 N. Y. 15 (1880) ; Jackson v. Littell, 56 N. Y. 108 (1874);
National Fire Ins. Co. v. McKay, 5 Abb. Pr. N. S. 445, 454 (N. Y. 1867) ; Donovan v.
Twist, 85 App. Div. 130, 83 N. Y. Supp. 76 (3d Dep't 1903) ; Note (1929) 58 A. L. R.
345, 360 et seq.
144. Sparrow v. Kingman, 1 N. Y. 242 (1848) (but cf. concurring opinion at 258);
Note (1929) 58 A. L. R. 345, 381 et seq.
145. Note (1929) 58 A. L. R. 345, 403-407.
146. Id. at 409.
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the purchase price of the after-acquired title 47 and may be the subject
of conflicts with others claiming through the common grantor or mort-
gagor.' "48 Purchase money mortgages are in a special class because they
are ordinarily intended to secure the payment of the exact estate con-
veyed by vendor to vendee. If the parties bargain for a greater security,
there is no reason for not enforcing the bargain.' 0 But if the grantor
has short-changed the vendee on the title contracted to be sold, and the
grantee cures the defect through outside purchase, a result which gives
the mortgagor credit against the mortgagee, by offset, counterclaim or
otherwise, regardless of the warranties in the mortgage or covenants
in the deed, seems desirable.'
If a junior mortgagor, after being divested of title, reacquires the
premises through a paramount foreclosure, tie junior mortgagee may
succeed in reestablishing his lien. It is well to note here, though beyond
the scope of this paper, that a junior lien may not be destroyed by fraud
or conspiracy.'' Neither the owner's liability for payment of the junior
lien nor any covenants or warranties he may have given have any bear-
ing here. Fraud is generally found not to exist where the property's
income is insufficient for taxes, service of mortgages and carrying
charges. 52 In New York, at least, an owner or mortgagee may not
acquire a superior tax lien for the purpose of cutting off paramount
interests in the property. 53 But aside from fraud or conspiracy, liability
on the mortgage may justify the re-creation of a junior lien after a senior
foreclosure. Under one theory, reacquisition of the property is but the
payment of the senior mortgage under compulsion of the power of sale,
leaving the junior mortgage intact. Under another theory, the mortgagor
is estopped from attacking the junior lien by the warranties or covenants
in the junior mortgage. 54
147. See Note, L. R. A. 1918B 734, 774 et seq.; cf. Duer v. Jaeger, 113 Misc. 743,
186 N. Y. Supp. 584 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
148. See Note (1923) 25 A. L. R. 83.
149. See Hitchcock v. Fortier, 65 Ill. 239, 242 (1872).
150. The cases are not uniform. See Jackson v. Marsh, 5 Wend. 44 (N. Y. 1830)
and cases collected in Notes (1923) 26 A. L. R. 173, L. R. A. 1918B 734, 771 ct scq.
151. Byrnes v. Owen, 243 N. Y. 211, 153 N. E. 51 (1926); Garlasco v. Smith, 250
App. Div. 534, 294 N. Y. Supp. 772 (1st Dep't 1937), aff'd, 276 N. Y. 666, 13 N. E.
(2d) 53 (1938); see Dorff v. Bornstein, 277 N. Y. 236, 240, 241, 14 N. E. (2d) 51, 53,
54 (1938).
152. See Dorff v. Bornstein, 277 N. Y. 236, 240, 241, 14 N. E. (2d) 51, 53, 54 (1938);
dissenting opinion in Kossoff v. Wald, 245 App. Div. 646, 652, 284 N. Y. Supp. 130,
137 (1st Dep't 1935), rev'd, 272 N. Y. 480, 3 N. E. (2d) 878 (1936).
153. Laventall v. Pomerantz, 263 N. Y. 110, 188 N. E. 271 (1933), (1933) 42 YALE
L. J. 971, (1933) 46 HARv. L. Rnv. 1036; see Note (1933) 84 A. L. R. 1366; Wheder
v. Handy, 123 Alisc. 775, 206 N. Y. Supp. 148 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
154. See Wood and Oberreich, Revial of a Second or Subsequent Mortgage (1936)
11 IN-D. L. J. 429, 430-433.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Other arguments have been advanced with less cogency, both for and
against re-creation. It has been suggested that an owner owes a junior
mortgagee a duty to pay a prior mortgage. But even if the owner were
liable on the first mortgage, which is not always true, the second mort-
gagee is no beneficiary within the requirements of third party contracts.
The argument that reestablishment is a windfall for the junior mort-
gagee disregards the fact that the latter's recovery thereby cannot exceed
the amount of his mortgage. It is said that the junior mortgagee's failure
to protect himself at the senior foreclosure destroys his rights. Though
this is true with respect to those claiming through a paramount mortgage,
it should have no effect on the mortgagor's status. Application of the
theory of estoppel to this situation has been criticized upon another
ground. After predicating title by estoppel upon a failure of title when
the warranty is made, commentators have pointed out that the owner,
by subsequent divesture followed by reacquisition, does not acquire an
outstanding title which he lacked at the inception of the mortgage. They
have suggested that warranties should be construed merely as agreements
that the mortgagor will not acquire an adverse interest during the con-
tinuance of the junior lien. 1' This argument presupposes that covenants
and warranties, regardless of the plain meaning of their language, require
but an initial compliance, after which the junior lien would continue only
during the warrantor's pleasure. Analogies drawn to the right of a
grantor under a warranty deed to reacquire the property conveyed by
adverse possession or through a tax title, are bad because in such event
reacquisition is based on the grantee's fault. A grantor never intends
to pay taxes accruing after a conveyance.
Efforts by junior lienors to reimpose their liens after senior fore-
closure arise in these situations: where an owner liable on two mort-
gages, or only on the second mortgage, buys at the senior foreclosure,
or from the purchaser or subsequent owner; where the junior mortgage
contains general or special warranties which may or may not be ex-
pressly subordinate to the senior mortgage; where the junior mortgagor
has or has not been discharged in bankruptcy prior to reacquisition; as
well as variations on the foregoing. The cases outside New York are
hopelessly in conflict in all these situations except that in which the owner
is liable at least on a junior mortgage containing unqualified covenants
and warranties.' 50 In this event, reacquisition directly at the senior fore-
155. See authorities cited note 156 infra.
156. See Wood and Oberreich, Revival of a Second or Subsequent Mortgage (1936)
11 IND. L. J. 429; White, Revival of Mortgages (1936) 10 U. oF OIN. L. Rv. 217;
(1894) 7 HARv. L. REv. 429; Notes (1937) 111 A. L. R. 1285, (1927) 51 A. L. R. 445,
L. R. A. 1918B 734, 770-771.
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closure sale reimposes the lien, subject to purchase money mortgages
and other intervening equities.1
The leading case on this subject is Otter v. Lord Vaux, where an owner
made two mortgages, the second expressly subordinate to the first."' The
owner's direct acquisition through a senior foreclosure was held to re-
impose the junior lien on the payment theory. The same result was
reached in New York where the owner's procedure was called a "device
and contrivance."' 59 The court felt that the money used to acquire the
fee should have been used to pay the first mortgage. In the Otter case,
the English court questioned whether th'e same result would follow if
reacquisition were through a third person, for in such event there would
be no "payment" of the senior mortgage. The payment theory cannot
logically be applied to any case other than that of direct reacquisition.
Indirect reacquisition may, however, defeat the junior mortgagee, at
least in the absence of fraud. In Kossoff v. Wald, defendant Greenberg
acquired property subject to two mortgages, neither of which he assumed.
At a time when income from the property was insufficient to carry both
mortgages, Greenberg and the first mortgagee agreed that if the latter
foreclosed he would reconvey to the former. The premises were deeded
to Greenberg's nominee after foreclosure. In an action to reinstate the
junior mortgage, judgment was given for the defendants.C In Dorff
v. Bornstein, the facts were similar except that the owner was liable
on both mortgages. Four months after acquisition the senior mortgagee
conveyed to the owner's children, whom the lower court found to be
nominees for their parent. Again, judgment was given for the defend-
ant.' 6' The Court of Appeals ruled the foreclosure had destroyed all
estates in the property, cut off all rights of redemption and vested an
indefeasible title in the mortgagee with an unqualified power to transfer.
The Dorff decision makes it virtually certain that, in the absence of fraud,
reestablishment of junior liens in New York is limited to the mortgagor's
direct reacquisition at the senior foreclosure sale. The court found:
". . .there was no duty arising under any contract, provision of
law or consideration of equity which required the owner of the
property to protect the second mortgage against the foreclosure of
the first mortgage. The second mortgage indenture, in express terms,
made it subordinate to the lien of the first mortgage."' 02
157. Duer v. Jaeger, 113 Mlisc. 743, 186 N. Y. Supp. 584 (Sup. Ct. 1920); cf. text
at notes 147-148 supra.
158. 2 K. & J. 650 (C. 1856), aff'd, 6 DeG. M. & G. 638 (1856).
159. Hilton v. Bissel, 1 Sand. C. 407 (N. Y. 1844) ; accord, Van Hore v. Everson,
13 Barb. 526 (Sup. Ct. 1852); see Dorff v. Bornstein, 277 N. Y. 236, 242, 14 N. E.
(2d) 51, 54 (1938) ; Williams v. Thorne, 11 Paige 459, 464-465 (N. Y. 1845).
160. 272 N. Y. 480, 3 N. E. (2d) 878 (1936).
161. 277 N. Y. 236, 14 N. E. (2d) 51 (1938).
162. 277 N. Y. 236, 243, 14 N. E. (2d) 51, 54 (1938).
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The court, however, made no reference to a covenant in the second mort-
gage to warrant and defend title." 3 Yet in Ganz v. Clark,"'0 the same
court held a lessor responsible to his lessee for breach of covenant of
quiet enjoyment after termination of a lease by foreclosure of a para-
mount mortgage and this time made no reference to a clause expressly
subordinating the lease to the mortgage.'0 5
It is interesting to note that, although a mortgagor may not set up a
prior mortgage against his mortgagee, he may with a little care acquire
a fee through this mortgage which will survive the extinction of his
junior mortgage. Once a second mortgage but not always a second
mortgage! The junior mortgagee is not entirely helpless, however. His
debt is still enforceable.' The Dorff case prevents the clogging of
estates in the hands of bona fide purchasers, with the familiar implica-
tions of prospective purchasers being scared off while the property de-
teriorates materially in value. Yet the Negotiable Instruments Law,
which is zealous to promote the free exchange of commercial paper, gives
no such protection to an intermediate holder."0 7 Clogging of titles could
be reduced by shortening the relevant statute of limitations.
Finally, the purchaser of part of a mortgaged tract who assumes the
entire mortgage thereby subjects the part purchased to a primary respon-
sibility for payment of the mortgage.'0 8 And this is without reference
to Warranties. Suppose a blanket mortgage covers parcels A and B. X,
the owner, sells B to Y who assumes the mortgage. In a foreclosure of
the blanket mortgage, X, or any subsequent owner of A, may have B
offered first for sale for the purpose of exonerating A of the mort-
gage, 169 even though Y has in the interim sold B to Z merely subject to
the mortgage. 70 If parcel A is sold at foreclosure, any owner of A may
recover a judgment from Y for the value of A, on the ground that A
was applied under compulsion of law toward satisfaction of Y's debt."'
For this reason, should any owner of B, the land primarily responsible
163. The mortgage provided: "That the mortgagor warrants title to the premises"
(Record on Appeal fol. 387), a clause construed by statute as a covenant to warrant
and defend title. N. Y. REAL Paop. LAW § 254(5).
164. 252 N. Y. 92, 169 N. E. 100 (1929).
165. Record on Appeal, fol. 36, Ganz v. Clark, 252 N. Y. 92, 169 N. E. 100 (1929);
cf. Jackson v. Hoffman, 9 Cow. 271 (Sup. Ct. 1828).
166. Weisel v. Hagdahl Realty Co., Inc., 241 App. Div. 314, 271 N. Y. Supp. 629
(2d Dep't 1934), 48 HARV. L. REv. 126.
167. See NEoiiABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 58; Chaffee, Reacquisition of a Negotiablc
Instrument by a Prior Party (1921) 21 CoL. L. Rav. 538.
168. Bowne v. Lynde, 91 N. Y. 92 (1883); Note (1926) 44 A. L. R. 608.
169. Judson v. Dada, 79 N. Y. 373, 377 (1880).
170. Eyring v. Hercules Land Co., 9 App. Div. 306, 41 N. Y. Supp. 191 (4th Dep't
1896).
171. Russell v. Pistor, 7 N. Y. 171 (1852).
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for the blanket mortgage, become the owner of the mortgage, the mort-
gage would thereupon become cancelled as to A. 1 2
A survey of the creation and effect of mortgage liability covers but
half of the mortgagee's problems. Further issues include the remedies
of the mortgagee and the effect thereon of the emergency mortgage and
subsequent statutes, the rights over of the mortgagor, and the release of
the mortgagor by events subsequent to the conveyance. These subjects
are reserved for further extended treatment.
172. Wilcox v. Campbell, 35 Hun. 254 (5th Dep't 1835), aff'd, 106 N. Y. 325,
12 N. E. 83 (1887).
